SOLAREUM
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  • Solareum (SRM)
    • ๐Ÿ“ƒExecutive Summary
    • ๐Ÿ”ฅSolareumโ€™s Solution
    • โญSolareumโ€™s Value Proposition
    • ๐Ÿ’ซFinal Thoughts
  • About Solareum
    • ๐Ÿ‘ฉโ€๐ŸซWhat is SolareumChain?
    • โž—Mathematical Analysis of Validators
  • Solareum Proof of Generation
    • ๐ŸงŠSolareum Proof of Generation
    • ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธThe BLS12-381 Elliptic Curve for zk-SNARK Proofs
      • FPGA Hardware
  • BLS Key Generation Signature Scheme Security
    • โ™ป๏ธBLS Key Generation
      • Extract
      • Expand
      • IKM to lamport SK
      • parent SK to lamport PK
      • HKDF mod r
      • derive child SK
      • derive master SK
    • ๐Ÿ’ฑPost-quantum security backup upgrade
  • SolareumChain Algorithmic Security
    • ๐Ÿ”SolareumChain Algorithmic Security
    • ๐Ÿ”ฎBLS signature aggregation and Multisig security
      • BLS Signature Aggregation
      • Multisig Security
      • BLS signature aggregation definitions
    • ๐ŸซProving security definition references
      • Gedankenexperiment Setup
      • Gedankenexperiment Signature queries
      • Gedankenexperiment Forgery
      • Security and co-CDH Assumption
    • โœณ๏ธAdversaries and message query theorems
    • ๐Ÿ’ Multi-Input Transactions and Transaction Validation Caching
      • SolareumChain Multi-Input Transactions
      • SolareumChain Transaction Validation Caching
  • SolareumChain ReFi Implementation
    • ๐Ÿ’ฅProof of Hold (PoH)
    • ๐Ÿง‡SolareumChain Inherited NFT Multipliers
  • SolareumChain Architecture and PoG Math
    • โ›“๏ธSolareumChain Architecture and PoG Math
    • ๐Ÿ’ฃSocietal Impact of Blockchain Technology
    • ๐Ÿ’กEnergy Generation Analysis and Correlation
    • ๐Ÿ”‹Energy Correlation Assurance Functions
    • ๐Ÿงฉzk-SNARK Validation
      • Case Study I: Proof of Hold and no Proof of Generation
      • Case Study II: No Proof of Hold and Proof of Generation
      • Case Study III: Proof of Hold and Proof of Generation
    • ๐ŸŽดSolareumChain Address Generation
    • ๐ŸŽฑSolareumChain Genesis Architecture
    • ๐ŸฑDistributed Ledger Technology Energy Sustainability
    • ๐ŸŒ‰SolareumChain Bridge
    • โšกSufficiency of Sub 128-bit Security for Pairing-Friendly Curves on SolareumChain
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    • ๐Ÿ“Conclusion
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  1. SolareumChain Algorithmic Security
  2. BLS signature aggregation and Multisig security

BLS signature aggregation definitions

Consider a bilinear pairing

e:G0ร—G1โ†’GTe : G_0 ร— G_1 โ†’ G_Te:G0โ€‹ร—G1โ€‹โ†’GTโ€‹

which is efficiently computable, non-degenerate, and all three groups have prime order q, and g0 โˆˆ G0 and g1 โˆˆ G1 are generators. Let

H0:Mโ†’G0H_0 : M โ†’ G_0H0โ€‹:Mโ†’G0โ€‹

be a Hash function treated as a random oracle.

Then the BLS signature scheme using the following definitions:

KeyGen(): choose ฮฑ โ† Zq randomly, let h โ† g ฮฑ 1 โˆˆ G1, output pk := (h), sk := (ฮฑ). Sign(sk,m): output ฯƒ โ† H0(m) ฮฑ โˆˆ G0 Verify(pk,m,ฯƒ): if e(g1, ฯƒ) = e(pk, H0(m)) output accept, otherwise reject. With triples (pki , mi , ฯƒi) for 1 โ‰ค i โ‰ค n, anyone can aggregate the signatures ฯƒ1, ..., ฯƒn โˆˆ G0 into a short convincing aggregate signature ฯƒ by computing

ฯƒโ†ฯƒ1โ‹…โ‹…โ‹…ฯƒnโˆˆG0.ฯƒ โ† ฯƒ_1 ยท ยท ยท ฯƒ_n โˆˆ G_0.ฯƒโ†ฯƒ1โ€‹โ‹…โ‹…โ‹…ฯƒnโ€‹โˆˆG0โ€‹.

Verifying an aggregate signature ฯƒ โˆˆ G_0 is done by checking that the following condition is satisfied:

e(g1,ฯƒ)=e(pk1,H0(m1))โ‹…โ‹…โ‹…e(pkn,H0(mn)).e(g_1, ฯƒ) = e(pk_1, H_0(m_1)) ยท ยท ยท e(pk_n, H_0(m_n)). e(g1โ€‹,ฯƒ)=e(pk1โ€‹,H0โ€‹(m1โ€‹))โ‹…โ‹…โ‹…e(pknโ€‹,H0โ€‹(mnโ€‹)).

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Last updated 1 year ago

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